sillyolme

Why Does Typology Matter to Medical Professionals?

(Somewhat related post & another)

Or, does typology have any medical bearing on treatment? It seems the answer is a resounding no according to a litany of research on the topic.

A 2016 study of Chinese trans individuals (Yang et. al) found that sexuality has essentially no correlation with PCS (physical component summary) and MCS (mental component summary) of the measured quality of life. Table 3 indicates that the associations between orientation and PCS ranged from -0.005 to 0.098, all of which were far below statistical significance. It was the same for MCS; a range from -0.012 to -.121 that did not achieve statistical significance (the most accurate model has a correlation of -0.066). Now of course we could attribute this result to sample bias, statistical error, or using faulty statistical models, but luckily there are a host of other studies that replicate the finding.

Meier et. al 2013 found no differences in mental health variables between FtM individuals, other than a minor difference in anxiety (the only difference was between androphilic and ambiphilic individuals, all other comparisons were statistically insignificant). We should also note the interesting change in sexual orientation reported by FtM individuals during the process of transition (which I’ll eventually get around to a post on).

Nieder et. al reviewed the entire literature and found just 10 studies (which is sufficient for a literature review in the field) reporting on the association between sexuality and transition-related outcomes. Just one of these studies reported a difference;

Given the intense debate surrounding the predictive, outcome-related value of sexual orientation after transition-related interventions (Lawrence, 2014; Veale, 2014, 2015), it seems remarkable that out of 10 follow-up studies (Table 1), only one reported or found a significant association according to the outcome measures between groups based on sexual orientation at all (Wierckx et al., 2014). They found that trans women who are attracted to men (unfortunately mostly referred to as ‘homosexual male-to-females’, which pertains to the sexual orientation according to the sex assigned at birth) had higher sexual desire compared with trans women who are attracted to women

and

Further, sexual orientation was not associated with the prevalence of hypoactive sexual desire disorder (HSDD) (Wierckx et al., 2014). However, quality of life was not
assessed within this study.

Given the literature’s confirmation that sexual orientation is not related with transition-related outcomes, it is necessary for medical professionals to ask for sexual orientation? Perhaps, in scenarios that are directly relevant; STD prevention, sex therapy, relationship counseling/therapy. But to the majority of the health professionals that trans individuals will encounter, it seems entirely unnecessary for them to ask and inquire as to the deeply personal nature of their sexual orientation.

Even more, this casts doubt on the diagnostic value of the purported ‘autogynephilia’. If we can classify ‘autogynephilic transsexuals’ and ‘homosexual transsexuals’ into two different categories, but the outcomes don’t differ, is there any value in differentiation?

Some Other Readings

A description of historical gatekeeping which importantly mentions the factor of sexual orientation

The Harry Benjamin Society standards

His book depicting the prototypical classification scale (page 19)

Experiences of gatekeeping in Thailand, Czech Republic, Germany

Assumptions about sexuality in the trans community

All of this goes to show the gatekeeping that arose from sexual orientation classification

Update – 11/16/18

Given that I choose a poor title for this piece, I’ll clarify what I had intended to communicate with the wording & the thought process I went through went writing & publishing this piece at midnight.

I was searching for more research for another piece when I came across the Chinese study (Yang et. al), recalled the existence of Nieder et. al (the literature review) and thought that the two could work together to make a coherent article on how it isn’t necessary for one’s medical professionals to inquire about sexual orientation (and thus the false ‘typology’) in order to impact decisions on providing treatment to patients. The articles linked in the Some Other Readings section articulate the issues with medical professionals asking about sexuality and using that to deny or delay treatment, which was is my primary criticism of the use of sexuality in medicine in trans-specific contexts (which is not to say that I oppose it). The existence of gatekeeping was intended to be a theme throughout the piece (and is something that I am eventually going to get around to writing on). Even more, the piece’s even larger overarching goal (as is the blog’s) is to criticize Blanchardianist ideology & criticize autogynephilia typology.

The “re”formulation of the title as “Or, does typology have any medical bearing on treatment?” helps contextualize the original purpose of the piece (as do the links to Kay Brown’s articles), but the chosen title then influenced the irrelevant and poorly worded content of the piece.

But the language I used obscured all of this; Medical professionals is far too broad of a term to refer to the individuals I intended to refer to: psychiatrists, psychologists and therapists – those who very often make diagnoses of trans individuals; the people who’ve been reported denying letters, recommendations and treatment because of sexual orientation; the paradigmatic gatekeepers. There are plenty of valid instances to ask for sexual orientation (although there may be more prudent and sensitive methods of obtaining the necessary information): for risk assessments for STD prevention, some therapeutic contexts, and so on as commenters on the Reddit thread insightfully pointed out. Even more, my crude estimation of the makeup of medical professionals trans people encounter could be false in many instances: it could be, for instance, that a trans individual is post-transition and encounters their primary physician far more than their psychiatrist (if they even have one).

A longwinded way of saying I’m sorry for choosing such a poor title.

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sillyolme, TERFs

Gender Nonconforming

(Post in question #1)

(Post in question #2)

For years, clinicians, therapists, researchers, and transfolk alike have remarked that “younger transitioners”, transkids, “homosexual transsexuals”, “early onset” (whatever label or demarcator in fashion) MTF transsexuals simply ‘pass’ better than “older transitioners”, autogynephilic transsexuals, “late onset” MTF transsexuals. For years, I wanted to conduct a study about this. Well, now we have clinical data to test this observation.

Who would have realized that male-attracted females are more gender-typical.

The Dutch have long contended that age of onset was the salient signifier, while those in North America contend that it is sexual orientation, specifically “homosexual” vs. “non-homosexual”, which readers of my blog, and those familiar with the literature, know gives a strong signal / correlation with autogynephilia in MTF transsexuals.

‘The Dutch’ have published empirical studies showing this is the case for a number of other variables, while showing sexual orientation is a lesser factor. Furthermore, the homogenization of North American trans researchers to represent Canadian researchers and then Anne Lawrence is interesting considering that a number of clinics that Brown and Blanchard and co. criticize are also from North America. Moser, a critic of Blanchardianism, is also from North America. The clinics in my area don’t follow Blanchardianism, neither have any of my therapists or psychiatrists.

In the graphs below, a higher score means more gender incongruent appearance (i.e. ‘readable’), while a lower score means more gender congruent (i.e. ‘passable’).

Modern society has the unfortunate phenomenon of gender stereotypes and gender norms that are enforced on trans and GNC individuals. This means that people who choose to present themselves as something incongruent with their gender, they are ostracized. This effect is magnified for trans people who choose to present in this manner (feminine trans men, masculine trans women).

passingtrans

Interesting results, but the lack of controls for choice in presentation is problematic. I can’t tell what the lines are supposed to represent, but I’m guessing that it’s either error bars or range, either of which add some important caveats. If it’s error bars (my initial interpretation), then it seems as if the correlation is inconclusive. If it’s range, then we can’t make claims about universal ‘passability’ because there’s such a large range of results. I’d be interested to see the results for GNC cis lesbian, GNC cis straight, GC cis lesbian and GC straight women as a reference point, of course using a subgroup of post-transition trans people to ensure we aren’t comparing mid-transition trans people to cis people.

Or yet another way of putting is that the least passible androphilic is the same as the average non-androphilic transwoman

Assuming that the bars represent the range, then she’d be wrong. The least passable androphilic trans women is far higher than the average for non-androphilic trans women.

There’s one other interesting graph in the study that Brown ‘forgot’ to include. The only about BIS (Body Image Scale) that measures how satisfied an individual feels about their body.

transBIS

We can clearly see that the difference between androphilic and non-androphilic trans women is negligible, visually and statistically:

With regard to overall body satisfaction (i.e., BIS scores), no significant differences between sexual orientation and onset age subgroups were found in both natal sexes.

If non-androphilic trans women and androphilic trans women are equally satisfied with their body image, then it begs the conclusion that non-androphilic trans women are (relatively) content with their gender atypicality and probably even choose this. Among cis lesbian women, there is a much higher rate of chosen gender atypicality, as in “butch lesbians”, and the phenomenon of butch lesbian trans women has been documented by Leslie Feinberg.

If we hypothesize that the salient signifier is sexual orientation and NOT age of onset, then we would expect that the relative score for early onset would be intermediate between androphilic and both non-androphilic and late-onset (which is predominately non-androphilic at 79%).

The homogenized ‘Dutch’ believe that age of onset is a more significant signifier for a number of other variables, not exclusively passability.

That is to say, variation in the data is explained completely by sexual orientation and that the variation of passability with respect to age of onset is from the correlation between sexual orientation and age of onset.

The conflating of saliency with a variable explaining all of the variation of passability is disingenuous. The fact that one variable has the most significant single variable explanation does not mean other variables do not matter, or that 100% is explained by one variable.

However, given clinical experiences with each, the meaning of age of onset is quite likely different. If 43% of non-androphilic transwomen really did have an early onset… why do they all wait so long to socially transition?

I’ve given this some thought and come to the conclusion that if the etiology of FEFs is the internalization of gender dysphoria, then of course non-straight trans women are going to socially transition later on average. Regardless, we know this isn’t universally the case: Grossman et. al 2006 found that a majority of trans youth are non-“homosexual”:

While youth used a variety of terms to describe their sexual orientation, a majority of the FTM youth (15) used the word “queer”; other terms chosen were heterosexual, bisexual, and lesbian, with four youth not wanting to label their sexual orientation. In comparison, of the MTF youth, 14 identified as heterosexual, 8 as gay, 4 as bisexual, 3 as trans, 1 as lesbian, and 1 did not to select a label.

Now this is self-evidently anecdotal, but the only adolescent trans girls (I hate the term ‘girls’ but it’s the only applicable term I can think of here) that I’ve met are lesbians. And there are some interesting result about passability in this study too, so I recommend giving it a read.

We are still left with an open question. Why do androphilic transwomen pass so much better than non-androphilic? Three possible hypotheses exist, 1) Having a truly earlier age of onset and social transition age, they experience less masculinization from endogenous androgens. 2) Self selection for passibility as they are motivated to fit into society better, being both physically and behaviorally extremely gender atypical (and not autogynephilically motivated). 3) Actually being, as a group, intrinsically more physically gender atypical. (That is to say, that the etiological cause for their behavioral gender atypicality causes physical atypicality as well.)

I think that this passage, particularly point #3, really exposes Kay Brown for her beliefs. She doesn’t believe trans women are women, otherwise she wouldn’t say “gender atypical”. Feminine trans women are gender typical, because femininity is associated with womanhood. Masculine trans women are gender atypical, because masculinity masculinity is associated with manhood. The only way you can conclude that “androphilic transwomen” are “gender atypical” is if you consider their gender to be equivalent to the sex they were assigned at birth which is almost universally male.

There have been hints from a number of studies that there is a correlation between sexual orientation and subtle gender atypical facial physiognomy. A new study just how strongly supports this observation. Using a deep-layer neural net AI trained to categorize faces as heterosexual or homosexual, can differentiate between two faces, one of a heterosexual and one of a homosexual, of the same natal sex at 91% accuracy for males and 83% for females.

Citing this incredibly controversial study without referencing any of the controversy is a c h o i c e. The study has some serious methodological and logical flaws throughout, and is entirely based on the psuedoscience of physiognomy. This Medium article articulates the points better than I could. By ignoring social signaling and how the choices of what to wear (glasses, makeup) and shaving, they base their conclusions on biology rather than the obvious conclusion: that stereotypes exist. And even more, this Calling Bullshit piece explains the scientific flaws with how the study interprets its results.

The study could alternatively support the conclusion that lesbian women (cis and trans) and straight women (cis and trans) can be grouped together based on physiognomy (not one that I believe).

Onto the second article.

There is no “standard” to which behavior should “conform”. There is only behavior, period

Her first mistake is confusing the prescriptive for the descriptive. People using gender nonconforming (very often researchers studying trans people) are not saying that people should or should not conform to anything, just that they do or do not. She also seems to have missed the point as to what standard the term refers to: societal standards. It is far more socially acceptable to be a masculine man and a feminine woman than the reverse (something that has been noted by Brown herself). Conform can alternatively be interpreted as conformation to the majority, or what is most typical of the population. Gender nonconforming is a useful term politically in the first sense because by emphasizing societal standards, we offer a way to highlight those who are harmed by them and advocate for their abolition.

However, if we look at, study in depth as scientists, a species we can say that there are behaviors that are far more commonly performed by them than other behaviors seen in other species. These we can label as “typical” for that species. If we see a behavior in a given individual of a species that is uncommon for that species, we may label it “atypical”; but we would never label it “non-conforming” since we can’t really say what standard that a given species should “conform” to.

Again, nothing about gender nonconforming terminology talks about what standard an individual should conform to (as that would be a prescriptive statement), it’s describing how conformity (a social phenomenon used everywhere in the social sciences, and sometimes in the natural sciences) functions in punishing feminine men and masculine women. This is actually something recognized later in the piece, where she uses the word conform to describe the same phenomenon, while failing to recognize the meaning of gender nonconforming:

Given the religious (or related social views of gender) prejudice, one can easily see how children who exhibit these gender atypical behaviors are placed under tremendous pressure to “conform” to gender behavior standards that tend to skew to the gender typical, or even an exageration of typical behavior.

The irony.

But even deeper, is my objection to the post-modernist idea that there are no intrinsic sexually dimorphic behaviors in humans, that there are only socially constructed roles.

The everpresent postmodern (-‘ist’ in this case) strawpersyn persists. Nothing about postmodern analysis precludes the existence of sexually dimorphic behavior and some queer theorist researchers have even incorporated that into their analysis.

This notion would state that since all differences in behavior observed between the human sexes are socially constructed and maintained, there must be a socially defined standard to which we can conform or not.

There is a socially defined standard to which we can conform or not, but that is not because of ‘differences in behavior observed between the human sexes are socially constructed and maintained’ (which is definitionally true if anti-constructionists would bother to read Ian Hacking’s The Social Construction of What?), it’s because we can observe this in society.

Thus, both of these ideas reduce any behavior that is seen in an individual that is uncommon in that person’s sex to an act of “gender non-conformity” either by accident or by will… but never by nature. I find both the notion that we stand outside of nature to be scientifically preposterous and philosophically offensive.

The assertion that gendered behavior is caused by social differences rather than nature isn’t saying that we stand “outside of nature”. Her logic is a non-sequitur. The nature-nurture dichotomy has been explicitly criticized by the so-called “post-modernists” she’s alluding to (she never names them by name, but the ‘postmodernists’ that study sex and gender usually fall into the category of queer theory). Dichotomies are constantly questioned by post-structuralists, including true-false, gay-straight, man-woman and so on. My favorite example is Judith Butler:

Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist anthropology, including the problemaic nature/culture distinction, has been appropriated by some feminist theorists to support and elucidate the sex/gender distinction: the position that there is a natural or biological female who is subsequently transformed into a socially subordinate “woman,”with the consequence that “sex” is to nature or “the raw” as gender is to culture or “the cooked.” If Lévi-Strauss’s framework were true, it would be possible to trace the transformation of sex into gender by locating that stable mechanism of cultures, the exchange rules of kinship, which effect that transformation in fairly regular ways. Within such a view, “sex” is before the law in the sense that it is culturally and political undetermined, providing the “raw material” of culture, as it were, that begins to signify only through and after its subjection to the rules of kinship.

This very concept of sex-as-matter, sex-as-instrument-of-cultural-signification, however, is a discursive formation that acts as a naturalized foundation for the nature/culture distinction and the strategies of domination  that that distinction supports. The binary relation between culture and nature promotes a relationship of hierarchy in which culture freely “imposes” meaning on nature, and, hence, renders it into an “Other” to be appropriated to its own limitless uses, safeguarding the ideality of the signifier and the structure of signification on the model of domination.

and so on. For post-structuralists, a nature-nurture, nature-culture dichotomy is as incoherent as the man-woman dichotomy. Fausto-Sterling (who is not a post-modernist, but I expect would be similarly criticized by Brown) similarly criticizes the distinction between biology and culture in Sexing the Body (another fantastic read that shows how sex isn’t a natural phenomenon).

In other pages of this blog, I’ve made reference to the single most sexually dimorphic behavior in humans: androphilia (sexual attraction to adult males). In female humans, it is extremely common to be attracted to men. Approximately 98% of women are attracted to men while only approximately 5-10% of men were attracted to men. One could object to this being a ‘natural’ phenomena and say that social expectations have defined this. But it would not fit the evidence that has been amassing that sexual orientation is neither “chosen” nor “taught”.

The entire division of behavior by sexual orientation is a social construct. We can note that sexuality is constructed differently in many societies: Latin America and ancient Rome didn’t conceptualize penetration and being penetrated as equivalent forms of sexuality that are both classified under the label ‘homosexual’ or ‘gay’. In fact, penetration was classified as

Further, why should humans be unique in the world? Most mammalian species are sexually dimorphic in their sexual attractions. (No, I’m not denying that same sex behavior occurs in non-human species… only saying it is not as common as other sex attraction.) But, this isn’t the end of the story.

I will quote Daphna Joel and Lutz Jäncke on this matter.

Joel [,] has recently suggested that such evidence may be found in animal studies reporting that the effects of sex on the brain differ even to the point of opposition under varied environmental conditions and that sex-by-environment interactions may differ for different brain features. For example, Reich et al. [] found that three weeks of mild stress reversed a sex difference in the density of CB1 receptors in rats’ dorsal hippocampus. Thus, what was typical in one sex category under some conditions (i.e. low density of CB1 receptors in non-stressed females and high density of CB1 receptors in non-stressed males) was typical in the other sex category under other conditions (i.e. following three weeks of stress). A different sex-by-environment interaction determined the density of CB1 receptors in the ventral hippocampus, as the same manipulation (three weeks of mild stress) eliminated a sex difference in the density of these receptors in the ventral hippocampus.

and

In contrast to humans, genetic, developmental and environmental conditions can be highly controlled in laboratory animals. Thus, the variability of factors that might interact with sex to affect the brain (such as age, stress, housing conditions, nutrition, history of drug exposure; for references and review, see [,]) is greatly reduced. Consequently, brains of laboratory animals in a specific experiment are expected to be less heterogeneous compared with brains of humans in a single study. Therefore in laboratory animals, differences between the sex categories may indeed reveal the effects of sex rather than the effects of some chance difference between the sample of females and the sample of males in the study.

and

Although in animals there is probably no equivalence to gender as a social system, there are still environmental variables that, in addition to physiological variables (e.g. weight), correlate with sex category (e.g. number of animals in the home cage []). Studies in laboratory animals that use sex category as a variable should take special care to either control for (physiological) and avoid (environmental) sex differences in these variables, or systematically manipulate them.

and

This research has also been strongly influenced by animal research, where it is much easier than it is in humans to study genetic differences in terms of sex/gender, including at the molecular, hormonal, and neurophysiological levels , . However, it is not a simple endeavor to transfer results and interpretations from animal research to explain human behavior and cognition, since there are still some substantial differences between humans and other animals. One major difference is that the brain of humans is different in many respects from the brain of most other animals, although the human brain comprises the same neurons as even simpler constructed animals. The human brain comprises the largest number of neurons compared with all other animals in absolute terms . In addition, it is characterized by extreme, and in the animal kingdom unprecedented, interconnectivity that provides the necessary basis for the computation and storage of information, which is necessary for human learning and culture . This huge neural network is also significantly plastic and can be shaped by individual experience and practice

Let’s move on.

Had the strong social construction hypothesis of all gendered behavior been true, there would have been no correlation. We can reject this hypothesis.

Specifically note that she said correlation. Without causation, we cannot reject the social construction hypotheses because we could have not controlled for enough socioenvironmental variables.

This likely also extends past adolescence to explain the rather dramatic differences in passability between androphilic transwomen and gynephilic transwomen

Interesting how she overstates the ‘passability’ difference.

Being gender atypical in brain organization, it would naturally lead to later androphilia, gender atypical motor skills (feminine walk and hand gestures), and gender atypical vocal production (feminine or “gay lisp”).

Unfortunately, brain organization theory doesn’t have enough evidence to support it, especially given the predominance of the theory in contemporary neuroscience research. Rebecca Jordan-Young’s Brain Storm is a great read on this topic.

One would, at first glance, believe that those who hold the strong social construction hypothesis as true would then have no qualms about accepting gender atypical children and adults without reservation as breaking stereotypes.

Many do. For example, Andrea Dworkin, Catharine MacKinnon, Monique Wittig, Gloria Steinem are all examples of radical feminists who are in favor of trans people’s existence.

But, as we can easily discern, they often do not, as demonstrated by the minority movement within the gay and lesbian (mostly lesbian) communities of being “gender critical”

Overwhelmingly, adherents to gender critical ideology are women and most theorists are (or at the very least profess to be) radical feminists (the followers are somewhat different).

They philosophically approve of people being gender atypical… but only to a very specified point, accepting the gender normative roles that were established during the early Gay Liberation Movement.

I spend quite a bit of time reading and contesting gender critical ideology, so I like to think that I’m “educated” on it. I can definitely say that radical feminists and gender critical feminists believe themselves to be against gender roles. Their issue with trans people is that they:

  1. Believe that gender nonconforming people are erased by ‘trans ideology’. This is because they so often see female-attracted trans men transitioning (or very often themselves) who were previously butch lesbians, and male-attracted trans women that used to be feminine gay men. From their point of view, transitioning and claiming oneself to be a man/woman erases GNC individuals and turns them into gender-conforming individuals. A butch lesbian is GNC, a masculine man is not. A feminine gay man is GNC, a feminine woman is not.
  2. Believe gender roles are reified by ‘trans ideology’. While I do have gigantic issues with certain trends within some trans subcultures and communities, they by and large misrepresent the trans community to conclude that trans people reinforce gender roles. From their POV, telling feminine men that they must be women means that femininity in men is unacceptable and treated with transition. On the /r/GenderCritical sidebar (right side), there is a diagram that helps elucidate their actual beliefs.

sz2yhf3

By erasing the lived experiences of trans people and ignoring those important things called gender dysphoria and freedom, they construct their narrative that ‘trans ideology’ reifies gender roles. Now I do agree that ‘gender critical’ feminists tend to uphold and reinforce gender roles, it’s for quite different reasons than their lack of support for transition (which has more to do with a fundamental reification of the beauty of ‘original bodies’ and narratives about mutilation). When discussing and analyzing gay men and trans people, they tend to uphold the exact stereotypes they profess to oppose.

The moment that an individual steps past that point, there will be those who will denounce them as hewing to the very stereotypes that they break, but in the opposite gendered sense, denying that underlying sexually dimorphic behavior as valid.

They are (usually, but it varies based on the topic: they are often very opposed to drag queens) completely fine with feminine men, in fact that’s exactly what they wish trans women to live as. The unnecessary mutilation of their bodies is what they oppose (but as we all know, transition is neither unnecessary or mutilation).

sillyolme

Prisons

(Post in question)

Where trans people should be located in prisons is, of course, a contentious topic. I think the easiest solution is to abolish prisons, but that’s beyond the scope of this essay today.

Kay Brown perpetuates an ugly myth about trans women, one that has debunked by the author of the study herself;

“In the Dhejne study following up a cohort of post-op transsexuals they found,”

Male-to-females had a significantly increased risk for crime compared to female controls (aHR 6.6; 95% CI 4.1–10.8) but not compared to males (aHR 0.8; 95% CI 0.5–1.2). This indicates that they retained a male pattern regarding criminality. The same was true regarding violent crime. By contrast, female-to-males had higher crime rates than female controls (aHR 4.1; 95% CI 2.5–6.9) but did not differ from male controls. This indicates a shift to a male pattern regarding criminality and that sex reassignment is coupled to increased crime rate in female-to-males. The same was true regarding violent crime.

Indeed, this is a direct quote from the study. But it ignores a few other important things located in the study. Namely, that that trans women and men did not have statistically identical crime rates when comparing the more recent data period, and that the study did not break down what types of crimes were committed.

If we look at what the lead author of the study has said in various interactions:

In a Reddit AMA:

Regarding criminality there are only results from either both trans women and trans men and displayed for the whole period 1973-2003 and for the periods of 1973-1988 and the 1989-2003. If one is only intrested in transwomen data is only available for the whole period. For only assigned med who had transition 1973-2003 they had committed more crimes than cis women and more violent crime than cis women. The number of transwomen who had comited crime durin gthis period was 32, and the number who had comitted violent crime were 14. Most likely some of the 32 transwomen who had comitted a any crime had also comitted a violent crime sop you can not add the numbers. Having a male pattern means that they did not differ regarding any crime or violent crime if compared with cis men. However even if I can’t say how it is for trans women specific one could see that if the whole group (tran women and trans men) are displayed together there is a very postive time trend. So after 1989 the transgender men and women together did not differ from cis gender men and women regarding comitting any crime or violent crime. This means that the trana population was not more criminal then the cis population after 1989. The actual number of any crimes for the transgroup is for 1973-2003 60, for 1973-1988 38 and for 1989-2003 22. The numbers of violent crimes are for 1972-2003 14, for 1973-1988 10 1989-2003 4

And again

For combined transgender females and males and for the whole period 1973-2003 we saw an increased risk of being dead ( in suicide and cardio vascular diseases) and of being hospitalized for any psychiatric morbidity and for suicide attempts. We saw a positive time trend regarding mortality, suicide attempts and any crime and violent crime. For the last period (1989-2003) the transgender group did not have any elevated risk of being dead or being hospitalized for suicide attempts or committing any crime or violent crime. They had the same risk as the controls. However the elevated risk for being hospitalized for psychiatric morbidity still remained. The elevated risk in the transgender group could be caused of many things which we were unable to control for. We were able to control for psychiatric morbidity and immigrant status but there are more variables which could explain increased mortality suicidality and psychiatric morbidity.

And with her interview with Cristan Williams:

The individual in the image who is making claims about trans criminality, specifically rape likelihood, is misrepresenting the study findings. The study as a whole covers the period between 1973 and 2003. If one divides the cohort into two groups, 1973 to 1988 and 1989 to 2003, one observes that for the latter group (1989 – 2003), differences in mortality, suicide attempts, and crime disappear. This means that for the 1989 to 2003 group, we did not find a male pattern of criminality

As to the criminality metric itself, we were measuring and comparing the total number of convictions, not conviction type. We were not saying that cisgender males are convicted of crimes associated with marginalization and poverty. We didn’t control for that and we were certainly not saying that we found that trans women were a rape risk. What we were saying was that for the 1973 to 1988 cohort group and the cisgender male group, both experienced similar rates of convictions. As I said, this pattern is not observed in the 1989 to 2003 cohort group.

The difference we observed between the 1989 to 2003 cohort and the control group is that the trans cohort group accessed more mental health care, which is appropriate given the level of ongoing discrimination the group faces. What the data tells us is that things are getting measurably better and the issues we found affecting the 1973 to 1988 cohort group likely reflects a time when trans health and psychological care was less effective and social stigma was far worse.

It’s pretty clear from the quote that the study doesn’t evidence any of the claims about rape.

“Dr. Watson’s suggestion that pre-operative male to female transsexuals would pose little physical risk to female prisoners was addressed by several of CSC’s witnesses. Dr. Dickey, Dr. Hucker and Ms. Petersen all disagree with Dr. Watson’s statement that most male to female transsexual inmates are attracted to men: To the contrary, they say, the majority of transsexuals in federal prisons are actually attracted to women. It takes serious criminal activity to qualify a person for a federal prison sentence in Canada. According to Dr. Dickey and Ms. Petersen, homosexual transsexuals do not generally have the degree of aggressiveness or psychopathy necessary to get them into a Canadian federal prison. The transsexuals that Dr. Hucker has encountered in the correctional setting tend, he says, to be “more ambiguous” in their sexual orientation… Dr. Dickey, Dr. Hucker and Ms. Petersen all say that they would be very concerned about putting a pre-operative male to female heterosexual transsexual inmate in a women’s prison, given the risk that the inmate would prey on female prisoners.”

The quote is real, but it’s heavily cherrypicked. The full quote can be found here and contains some significant flaws:

Further, Dr. Dickey queries why a homosexual male to female transsexual would want to move to a women’s prison

straight trans woman would want to moved to a women’s prison because she is a woman. She’d likely also want to move prisons because she’d be raped: trans women have sexual victimization rates of over 30% in men’s prisons.

Even more problematically, the case that the testimony comes from (Kavanagh vs Canada) had the conclusion that Kavanagh’s placement in a male prison violated her rights.

The physicians being cited testified over 17 years ago and the medical consensus has gradually shifted.

Then there is the concern that some transwomen may be a danger to children.  There have been several cases of transwomen in prison for sexual assault on, and even murder of, children.

Then there is the concern that some ciswomen may be a danger to children.  There have been several cases of ciswomen in prison for sexual assault on, and even murder of, children.

There is even documentation of two pedophiles seeking to transition and receive medical interventions who admitted a belief that as women their interest in being around children would be more socially acceptable!

I’d love to read the “documentation”, but I don’t think it’s surprising that some pedophiles have perverse motivations for doing any of the actions in their lives. This shouldn’t reflect upon trans women as a group, it just goes to show that pedophiles should never be in general population.

Denying it does not serve the transgender community.

A common tactic of Brown’s is to claim that some substantial or relevant portion of the trans communities or of trans activists deny that “bad trans people”™ exist when she never (or rarely) provides concrete examples.

Transfolk’s sexual orientation, etiology (taxonomic diagnoses), and surgical status must be considered but no hard and fast rule applied.

I don’t see how trans people’s sexual orientations are relevant here. Are we claiming that lesbian women should have their sexual orientation taken into account as to where they are going to be housed in prisons?

 A transwoman who has ever exhibited violent or sexual crimes (not including prostitution) should NEVER be housed in a women’s facility regardless of current surgical status.  That is to say, a rapist has forfeited the privilege and the prison system shouldn’t provide new victims to a predator.

Do we apply the same standards to:

a) cis women

b) cis men

Because anything else is outright transphobia. It’s not that I disagree with separating rapists from the general population on some abstract principle, but that it should a policy that’s implemented equitably among varying gender identities.

Blanchard, sillyolme

Do Blanchardians Have Good Intentions?

(Article in reference)

Following the rule of every headline has an answer of no, I’m going to argue that they don’t.

Blanchard, Bailey, & Lawrence… just listing them evokes waves of antipathy in the transgender communities, especially among late transitioning transwomen.  Ask many of them and you will be told that these three are hateful transphobes… in spite of copious evidence to the contrary.  But why?

There is actually like an enormous amount of evidence that Blanchard is a transphobe, so much that I’d argue it’s undeniable. The other two I can possibly see twisted reasoning as to why they’re not transphobes.

Blanchard

There’s a good article that summarizes how he views trans women from Andrea James’ website here.

“Not only do they see us as men, but they also consider transsexual women to be liars, guilty of “systematic distortion.” Below is an abstract from a Blanchard paper (when Blanchard says “heterosexual” and uses male pronouns, he means transsexual women attracted to women):”

The tendency for a heterosexual subject to describe himself in terms of moral excellence or admirable personal qualities was significantly correlated with scores in the ‘transsexual’ direction on all eight sexological measures; for the homosexual subjects, only one correlation was significant. [… It] is possible that the differences in the histories produced by transvestites and heterosexual transsexuals are exaggerated to an unknown degree by the motivation of the latter to obtain approval for this operation. The findings do not diminish the important distinction between these groups, but they do suggest caution in interpreting the self-report data that have been used in comparing them.

He also called postoperative trans women “men without penises”;

” Toronto psychologist Ray Blanchard, one of Canada’s leading — and most controversial — gender experts, argues the transgendered movement is rife with delusion. “This is not waving a magic wand and a man becomes a woman and vice versa,” he says. “It’s something that has to be taken very seriously. A man without a penis has certain disadvantages in this world, and this is in reality what you’re creating.”

He also regularly retweets transphobic and TERF content; for example this recent retweet stating that trans women are not women. And his retweet of 4th Wave Now. And his retweet of Transgender Trend. And several TERFs.

I’ll probably go into Bailey and Lawrence at another date.

A recent paper (Hannikainen 2018) explores the issue of lay people conflating the results of science research with the scientist’s ideology.  The study showed that there is a tendency to ascribe motivation “to prove” an hypotheses rather than simply to test one.  Further, this tendency, this effect, was more pronounced if the results, the data, were disagreeable to the individual evaluating the scientist by his results.

Here’s the issue. There are scientists who attempt to prove their hypotheses rather than test them. And I’d argue Anne Lawrence is probably the epitome of this type of scientist. Every single paper that is released on transgender individuals and their sexualities, she’s comments on it, “reinterprets it” (read: twists, ignores and lies about) and comes to the conclusion that every study that criticizes the Blanchardianist typology (most notably Nuttbrock et alsupports it. When new data showing that Blanchard’s claims are false, she does the same thing.

sillyolme

Kenneth Zucker is Still Bad – And Not An Ally To Trans People

As always, the post in question.

It’s a short post;

CAMH has issued a public apology for publishing false and defamatory statements about Dr. Zucker and his methods in treating transkids.  (I’ll hold my breath waiting for our community to do the same….)  As part of the vindication, CAMH is paying over half a million dollars as reparations and legal costs.

Interestingly, she gets a very easy fact wrong, probably because she forgot she’s American and Zucker is Canadian. The amounts listed in the settlement are $400000, $11000, $175000. This totals to $586,000 in Canadian dollars. When we convert this to American dollars, by the use of the handy Google converter, we note that is it significantly less at a sum of $451,000 American dollars.

Interestingly, the report has been removed and the alleged victim of Zucker’s ire has been erased and deemed a liar.

Regardless, Kenneth Zucker is decidedly not an ally of trans individuals.

He regularly retweets TERFs and TERF rhetoric (one example of three hours ago at the time of writing this post). I agree with some of the critiques in the tweet, decontextualized from the poster, their comments and their views on trans people, but the fact that Zucker retweeted such an egregiously transphobic poster is problematic to say the least.

He retweets Megan Murphy, 4th Wave Now and Fair Play for Women

He is further platformed by transphobes and ROGD-pushers; here

He is widely (NARTH) cited (LeaderU) by anti-gay groups that seek to convert gay children to straight (a practice now shown to be ineffective and that has been condemned by virtually all medical organizations in the United States).

He’s also been noted by his allies to perform conversion therapy on trans kids (using the real meaning, not Kay Brown’s bullshit meaning);

Zucker thinks that an important goal of treatment is to help the children accept their birth sex and to avoid becoming transsexual. His experience has convinced him that if a boy with GID becomes an adolescent with GID, the chances that he will become an adult with GID and seek a sex change are much higher. And he thinks that the kind of therapy he practices helps reduce this risk. Zucker emphasizes a three-pronged treatment approach for boys with GID. First, he thinks that family dynamics play a large role in childhood GID—not necessarily in the origins of cross-gendered behavior, but in their persistence. It is the disordered and chaotic family, according to Zucker, that can’t get its act together to present a consistent and sensible reaction to the child, which would be something like the following: “We love you, but you are a boy, not a girl. Wishing to be a girl will only make you unhappy in the long run, and pretending to be a girl will only make your life around others harder.” So the first prong of Zucker’s approach is family therapy. Whatever conflicts or issues that parents have that prevent them from uniting to help their child must be addressed.

The second prong is therapy for the boy, to help him adjust to the idea that he cannot become a girl, and to help teach him how to minimize social ostracism. Zucker does not teach boys how to walk in a manly fashion, but he does give them feedback about the likely consequences of taking a doll to school.

The third prong is key. Zucker says simply: “The Barbies have to go.” He has nothing against Barbie dolls, of course. He means something more general. Feminine toys and accoutrements—including Barbie dolls, girls’ shoes, dresses, purses, and princess gowns—are no longer to be tolerated at home, much less bought for the child. Zucker believes that toleration and encouragement of feminine play and dress prevents the child from accepting his maleness. Common sense says that a boy who wants to play with dolls so much that he is willing to risk his father’s wrath and his peers’ scorn is unlikely to change his behavior due to inconsistent feedback, sometimes forbidding, sometimes tolerating, and sometimes even encouraging it. Inconsistent parenting like this is ineffective in stamping out any kind of unwanted behavior.

Failure to intervene increases the chances of transsexualism in adulthood, which Zucker considers a bad outcome. … Why put boys at risk for this when they can become gay men happy to be men?

His practices are similarly gender normative, and would be condemned by any consistent anti-gender radical feminist (such as myself).

I could go on, but I think it’s self-evident that he supports conversion therapy and is deeply connected with transphobic and homophobic organizations.